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ABSTRACT 
This paper explores disclosure quality and its determinants in the Tunisian context. More 
specifically, we followed Beest and Braam (2012)’s approach in measuring disclosure quality 
and examined if disclosure quality and disclosure quantity shared the same determinants. We 
used a sample of 56 annual reports from non-financial companies listed on the Tunisian Stock 
Exchange for the years 2007 and 2008. Our results showed that board independence 
(managerial ownership) had both positive and negative effects on disclosure quality. However, 
the results showed that there were different determinants of disclosure quality and quantity. We 
contribute to disclosure studies by being the first study to examine disclosure quality in Tunisia. 
In addition, this study enables us to provide the Tunisian companies’ stakeholders (like 
regulators and managers) with a diagnosis of the determinants of disclosure quality and quantity. 
KEY WORDS 
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1. Introduction 
2 
 
Disclosure is a mechanism of control that protects investors and makes capital markets more 
efficient. It is a concept which is difficult to measure directly (Marston and Shrives, 1991). 
Generally, a proxy (which may be disclosure quantity or quality) must be selected as a variable 
of interest not directly observable and must be measured with a sufficient degree of accuracy. 
Nowadays, stakeholders require high quality information with sufficient quantity. Botosan 
(2004) argued that no universally accepted notion of disclosure quality existed. It could be 
defined as “information about the reporting entity that is useful to present and potential equity 
investors, lenders and other creditors in making decisions in their capacity as capital providers” 
(IASB, 2008). Demand for disclosure quality or decision-useful information arises from 
information asymmetry and agency conflicts between insiders (managers) and outsides 
(stakeholders). Consequently, for the users of annual reports, increasing the disclosure quality 
reduces information asymmetry. 
The measurement of disclosure quality is still extraordinary difficult (Hassan and Marston, 
2010); Marston and Shrives, 1991; Beattie et al., 2004). Quality has been elusive; it remains a 
subjective, multidimensional concept dependent on the context of the decision (Beattie et al., 
2004).  Previous research used different proxies to measure the quality of corporate disclosure.  
However, recent review articles criticised critically the proxies (Core, 2001 and Beyer et al., 
2010). Due to the difficulties of measuring disclosure quality, many previous researches used 
quantity as a proxy for quality (e.g. Hussainey et al., 2003). In their review paper, Beyer et al. 
(2010, p.311)) argued that: “A sensible economic definition of voluntary disclosure / financial 
reporting quality and direct derivation of measures from that definition is missing from the 
literature. This lack of an underlying economic definition hinders our ability to draw inferences 
from this work, and we recommend that future research address this issue”. 
In responding to Beyer et al. (2010), recent efforts were undertaken to measure the quality of 
corporate disclosure in developed countries. These included Anis et al. (2010), Bamber and 
McMeeking (2010) and Beest et al. (2009). In addition, previous literature suggested that 
disclosure quality might be related to disclosure quantity (Eng and Mak, 2003; Gul and Leung, 
2004) and, hence, disclosure quality and quantity shared the same determinants. The problem 
of the use of disclosure quantity as a proxy for disclosure quality generated our main research 
question: To what extent do disclosure quality and disclosure quantity share the same 
determinants? 
Given the scarcity of studies on the disclosure quality in the emerging economies and the call 
for research on this topic by Beyer et al. (2010), we aimed to elucidate it in Tunisia. On the one 
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hand, Tunisia is an African developing country of the MENA (Middle East and North Africa) 
zone. It has an emerging stock market composed of 57 listed companies among which there are 
25 financial institutions in which the minority shareholders are not well protected and there is 
weak regulation of corporate disclosure. On the other hand, the emergence of many changes 
related to the information environment on the Tunisian Stock Exchange (TSE) especially the 
promulgation of the Law No. 2005-96 dated 18/10/2005 concerned with the strengthening of 
financial security and the development of corporate governance in the economy, highlighted 
the need to disclose high quality information for the users of annual reports having real crises 
of confidence. However, this created new expectations of the Tunisian financial analysts and 
portfolio managers relating to the quality of corporate disclosure (Chakroun, 2012).  
Disclosure is a complex phenomenon. Through a critical review of disclosure theories, 
Alhtaybat et al. (2012) sought to map the theories to explain this phenomenon. The previous 
empirical results, which explained disclosure quantity and quality, were mixed and 
controversial. Our research objectives were: [a] to measure disclosure quality for a sample of 
Tunisian companies for the years 2007 and 2008; [b] to identify the determinants of disclosure 
quality; and [c] to find out if disclosure quality and disclosure quantity shared the same 
determinants. We contribute to the literature by being the first study to examine the disclosure 
quality in Tunisia which is one of the developing countries. In fact, research regarding Tunisian 
disclosure quality and its determinants in is missing from the previous work on disclosure; the 
matter which makes this research useful. Also, we drew on theories suitable for the Tunisian 
setting which are the agency and the stewardship theories. 
The paper describes disclosure quality in the Tunisian context. It identifies its determinants and 
concludes with a comparison between the determinants of disclosure quality and quantity. Our 
empirical test results failed to support the agency theory and provided some support for the 
stewardship theory. The empirical results, which did not support the predictions of the agency 
theory, indicated that some corporate governance mechanisms (board independence, 
managerial ownership) affected disclosure quality. In particular, our test results indicated 
clearly that disclosure quality was a substitute of board independence and a complement of 
managerial ownership. This result was in line with previous research which modelled, also, the 
link between disclosure and corporate governance in the Tunisian setting (Chakroun and 
Matoussi, 2012). Consistent with Anis et al. (2012) and Bamber and McMeeking (2010), the 
empirical results indicated, also, that the determinants of disclosure quality differed from the 
determinants of disclosure quantity. 
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The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 discusses the literature review 
and the development of the research hypotheses. Section 3 explains the research design. Section 
4 describes the data. Section 5 reports the empirical findings. Section 6 concludes the study. 
2. Literature Review  
2.1. Institutional Framework 
In Tunisia, the legal obligations for the annual reports are set by the Code of Commercial 
Companies1, the firms' accounting system (1997), which was established through  harmonizing 
standards with those of the IASB and the regulation of the Financial Market Council 2 
(Chakroun and Matoussi, 2012). Indeed, Article 201 of the Code of Commercial Companies 
gives no precision about the form and content of the annual report and states only about the fact 
that it must be “detailed”. In addition, Article 44 of the Regulation of the Financial Market 
Council3, approved by the Finance Minister’s Order of April 7 2000, lists the compulsory 
information to be provided in the annual report. In Tunisia, since there continued to be no strict 
regulation of the information disclosed in the annual report and no company had been penalized 
because of its non-compliance with the Law, we considered that all the information, which 
accompanied the financial statements in the annual reports, was voluntary information. 
In recent years, Tunisia’s legal environment of has undergone major changes and these have 
encouraged the Tunisian companies to disclose information at the highest level of quality in 
their annual reports.  In the main, this is reflected clearly in the promulgation of the Law No. 
2005-96, dated 18/10/2005, concerning the strengthening of financial security. In fact, in the 
Chapter 3 of this Law (Item 3 ‘new’), we found that: “The annual report on the management 
of the company must include the information determined by the regulation of the Financial 
Market Council and particularly, a presentation on results of operations, their foreseeable 
evolution and possibly changes in the way of development and presentation of financial 
statements, as well as elements of internal control”. This legislative reform was considered to 
be an external governance mechanism. In this Law, which was promulgated and became 
effective in October 2005, the legislator attempted to follow the international trends in 
information disclosure (e.g.  the 2002 Sarbanes Oxley Act in the USA and  the 2003 Financial 
Security Act in France). This Law aimed to reshape the financial disclosure requirements and 
introduced measures putting a greater obligation on publicly traded companies to improve their 
communications. In addition, this Law brought several changes to the Code of Commercial 
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Companies and introduced a series of measures to enhance accountability for companies; 
market transparency; and good corporate governance (Chakroun and Matoussi, 2012). 
In addition, despite the absence of a formal regulatory framework to mentor it, we noted a 
change in the corporate governance environment. This  was reflected by the Arab Institute of 
Business Leaders’ publications (in 2008 and updated in 2012) of a Guide about Good 
Governance Practices of Companies and a Guide of the Annual Report of the Tunisian 
Companies (in 2009); as well as the establishment (in 2009) of the Tunisian Center of Corporate 
Governance.  
2.2. Literature Review of Measurement Methods to assess the Quality 
of Financial Reporting 
Previous empirical researches developed and used various types of measurement methods and 
proxies4 assess and evaluate the quality of corporate disclosure (Healy and Palepu, 2001). We 
present the measures of: Beattie et al. (2004); Beretta and Bozzolan (2004a, 2004b, 2008); Anis 
et al. (2012); and Beest and Braam (2012). These measures are considered to be the key attempts 
to measure disclosure quality.  
 Beattie et al.’s (2004) first pioneering study to develop a measure of disclosure quality provided 
a general framework applicable to various types of information. This study stated that quality 
was a function of the quantity plus there was a four-dimensional framework for the content 
analysis of accounting narratives, namely: the spread (the number of topics disclosed); the time 
orientation of the information (historical or forward-looking); the financial orientation 
(financial/non-financial); and the quantitative orientation (quantitative/qualitative). In addition, 
this paper presents a computer-assisted methodology; explores the complex concept of quality; 
and the problematic nature of quality assessment. 
Beretta and Bozzolan (2004a) were restricted to the disclosure quality of risk information. The 
authors proposed a measure which captured four main dimensions, namely: the content of 
information (the quantity of disclosure based on pre-determined topics);5 the economic sign 
(positive/negative information); the type of information (financial/non-financial information); 
and the outlook orientation. Beretta and Bozzolan (2004b) argued that the quality of voluntary 
disclosure ought to be defined from the user’s perspective. In this regard, multidimensional 
frameworks should be based on a detailed analysis of the information needs expressed by 
specific segments of users on specific issues. Given the multifaceted nature of risk, this seems 
particularly important in the case of risk communication. 
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Beretta and Bozzolan (2008) were restricted to the disclosure quality of forward-looking 
information. They suggested a multidimensional measure which combined disclosure quantity 
and richness of information. Richness is a function of both width and depth. Disclosure width 
consists of disclosure coverage (the extent of disclosure of relevant topics) and disclosure 
dispersion (the spread of disclosure across different topics). Disclosure depth addresses the 
question of what information is disclosed. They identified four information attributes which 
represented disclosure depth, namely: outlook dimension; the information measurement type 
(qualitative/quantitative information; financial/non-financial information); and the economic 
sign (positive/negative news information). 
Anis et al. (2012) contributed to existing disclosure literature by providing a multidimensional 
measure for disclosure quality; this was supported by a valid framework (Botosan, 2004)6. They 
operationalized the qualitative characteristics of information and aimed to assess the quality of 
different dimensions of information simultaneously in order to determine the decision 
usefulness of financial reporting information. As a response to Botosan’s (2004) 
recommendation that disclosure quality measures  ought to use a well-established regulatory 
framework, Anis et al. (2012) considered the Operating and Financial Review best practice 
(OFR) framework (ASB, 2006) as a base for developing their measure of disclosure quality. 
This measure represents a sum of the following information attributes: forward-looking 
orientation; verifiability; relevance; supplementary and complementary financial statements; 
comprehensiveness; readability; balance and neutrality; and comparability. 
Beest and Braam (2012) examined whether there were differences between IFRS and US 
GAAP based financial reports in meeting the fundamental and enhancing qualitative 
characteristics for decision usefulness as defined in the Conceptual Framework of the IASB 
(2010). Fundamental and enhancing qualitative characteristics are the underlying attributes 
which contribute to the decision usefulness of information. “For financial information to be 
useful, it must be relevant and faithfully represent what it purports to represent”. The enhancing 
qualitative characteristics of understandability, comparability, verifiability and timeliness are 
complementary to the fundamental characteristics and distinguish more useful information 
from less useful information (IASB, 2010). Although, for a comprehensive assessment, the 
enhancing qualitative characteristics are perceived to be less important than the fundamental 
ones, it remains important to include them in the analysis. This study adds to the literature by 
developing and testing a comprehensive and compound financial reporting quality assessment 
tool which, both in terms of the fundamental and the enhancing qualitative characteristics as 
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defined in the Conceptual Framework of the IASB (2010), aimed to measure the decision 
usefulness of financial and non-financial reporting information in annual reports. 
Finally, we can say that there is no clear definition of disclosure quality and that its 
measurement is recognized as a relevant question which is still open in the literature.   
2.3. Disclosure Quantity versus Disclosure Quality 
On the one hand, disclosure quantity could be defined as the extent or amount of disclosed 
information. It could be measured via a content analysis which consists of counting the number 
of statements, sentences or words related to a specific topic (Guthrie et al., 2004; Milne and 
Adler, 1999; and Unerman, 2000) or via the use of indices (Patelli and Prencipe, 2007; Chau 
and Gray, 2002; Lang and Lundholm, 1993; Botosan, 1997…). Marston and Shrives (1991) 
provided a review of the use in accounting research of disclosure indices to measure disclosure 
quantity. On the other hand, information with high quality is a major factor that helps users of 
annual report to make rational decisions. In fact, Beuselinck and Manigart (2007) defined 
disclosure quality in terms of annual reports’ decision usefulness of. The disclosure quality was 
not being measured with a sufficient degree of accuracy (Beattie et al., 2004). Botosan (2004) 
argued that it was a function of information quality attributes proposed by a regulatory 
framework. These attributes could be the qualitative characteristics of information as proposed 
by the conceptual frameworks for financial reporting and proposed by regulatory bodies and 
recommendatory reports.  
The majority of the previous empirical studies did not make a clear distinction between the 
quantity and quality of disclosure (Hassan and Marston, 2010). In the same vein, Marston and 
Shrives (1991) argued that the index score “can give a measure of the extent of disclosure but 
not necessarily of the quality of disclosure”. Because of the difficulties in measuring disclosure 
quality and, in particular, the absence of a generally agreed model  and relevant and reliable 
techniques to measure it, researchers used disclosure quantity as a proxy for the quality of 
disclosure (e.g. Eng and Mak, 2003; Gul and Leung, 2004). Consequently, it was assumed that 
more information was related to the reduction of information asymmetries and there was a 
positive correlation between those disclosure quality and disclosure quantities (Botosan, 1997). 
Similarly, Amir and Lev, 1996; Hussainey et al., 2003; Schleicher et al., 2007; and Hussainey 
and Walker, 2009 used the quantity of forward-looking statements as a proxy for disclosure 
quality. These studies found that this information improved investors’ abilities to anticipate 
future earnings change. In addition, Cerbioni and Parbonetti (2007) disputed the idea that 
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quantity was a good proxy for quality. They individuated other aspects related to the quality of 
disclosure and used the semantic properties of the disclosed information, and on the content of 
information, as proxies for the quality of disclosure. Furthermore, Botosan (2004) argued that 
the measure of disclosure quality of Beretta and Bozzolan (2004a) counted only the number of 
information items and, hence, it did not differ from quantity-based measures used in previous 
research.  
However,  Beattie et al. (2004), Anis et al. (2012) and Berretta and Bozzolan (2008) criticized 
this approach. They contended that even if the quantity of disclosed information influenced the 
quality of information, an assessment on disclosure quality could not be based purely on this 
association. Beattie et al. (2004) overemphasized disclosure quantity as a component of 
disclosure quality. In addition, the authors did not justify their “key” assumption that firms, 
disclosing more information, were more likely to have a greater level of quality. Based on a 
sample of UK firms, Anis et al. (2012) provided empirical evidence that disclosure quantity 
was not a proper proxy for disclosure quality. In fact, whilst firms might disclose more 
information, such information could lack accuracy. Also, they showed that the determinants of 
disclosure quality and disclosure quantity were not identical. In addition Beretta and Bozzolan’s 
(2008)’ tests confirmed that richness and quantity of disclosure  were two independent 
dimensions and they revealed that, in assessing narrative disclosure, quantity was not a good 
proxy for quality. Their study’s empirical evidence supported the hypothesis that the 
dimensions, considered in the disclosure quality framework, gave a more realistic picture of 
disclosure than quantity and suggested that, in assessing the disclosure, these dimensions could 
be used to complement each other . 
2.4. Determinants of Disclosure Quality 
There was considerable research interest in the impact of corporate governance characteristics 
on corporate disclosure (Chakroun and Matoussi, 2012; Arcay and Vázquez, 2005; Cerbioni 
and Parbonetti. 2007; Ho and Wong, 2001; Eng and Mak, 2003; Gul and Leung, 2004; Chau 
and Gray, 2002; Forker, 1992; Cheng and Courtenay, 2006). We have much to learn still about 
the impact of corporate governance on the quantity and quality of disclosure. Following Anis 
et al (2012), we studied the association between corporate governance mechanisms and 
disclosure quality. Using firm-specific characteristics, Anis et al (2012) found that there were 
different determinants for disclosure quality and quantity; these supported their arguments that 
disclosure quantity was not a precise proxy for disclosure quality. Cohen et al. (2004) 
highlighted the relationship between corporate governance mechanisms and financial reporting 
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quality. They stated that “better” corporate governance led to improved financial reporting. 
Therefore, in addition to firm specific characteristics, we examined the impact of corporate 
governance mechanism related to board composition and ownership structure (the board 
independence; its size; the leadership structure; the managerial ownership; and the family 
control) on disclosure quality and quantity. 
The agency theory explains the relationship between the agency problem and corporate 
disclosure since it serves as one of the principal monitoring tools in ensuring that a manager’s 
policy decision aligns with his need (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). According to this theory, 
when the board is independent, this leads to a better control of management and, therefore, to a 
high quality of disclosure. For a sample of Italian companies, Patelli and Prencipe (2007) 
showed a positive relationship between the independence of the board and voluntary disclosure. 
Similarly, previous empirical studies’ results (Cheng and Courtenay, 2006; Cerbioni and 
Parbonetti, 2007; Apostolou and Nanopoulos, 2009; Lim et al., 2007; Chen and Jaggi, 2000) 
showed a positive relationship between the independence of the board and the voluntary 
corporate disclosure.  
In the Tunisian context, Chakroun and Matoussi (2012) found a negative and significant 
relationship between the board independence7 and the extent of voluntary disclosure linked 
closely to the mandatory one in the annual reports. This result was explained by the fact that 
independent administrators might be regarded as strangers to the company without being 
actually independent. The Code of Commercial Companies did not define an independent 
administrator and the Code did not require companies to include such administrators on their 
boards. In this case of Tunisia, the independent administrators could be considered to be only 
managers' advisers. Eng and Mak (2003) and by Barako et al. (2006) found the same results in 
the settings of Singaporean and Kenyan respectively. In conclusion, as predicted by the agency 
theory, we expect the positive relationship between the board independence and the quality of 
disclosure. In fact, through the increase of disclosure quality, the presence of independent 
administrators leads to a reduction of the agency problems. 
H 1: There is a positive relationship between the board independence and the quality of 
disclosure 
There is a complex relationship between the size of the board and disclosure quality. Chakroun 
and Matoussi (2012) confirmed that, in Tunisia, voluntary disclosure was  a recent event. When 
we assumed that the culture of the quality of disclosure was not deeply rooted in the minds of 
10 
 
most of the Tunisian managers, it was very likely to see, in the large-sized boards, members 
who encouraged the increase of the disclosure quality. Namely, when boards are large, it is 
more likely that they include administrators who tend to favour the best quality of disclosure. 
Chakroun and Matoussi (2012) and Barako et al. (2006) stated that there existed a positive and 
significant relationship between the size of the board and the extent of voluntary disclosure. 
Moreover Jouini (2013) found a positive but insignificant relationship between the size of the 
board and the level of financial disclosure. Therefore, we expect that companies with large-
sized boards8 disclose a higher quality of information. 
H 2: There is a positive relationship between the size of the board and the quality of disclosure 
The stewardship theory argues that shareholder interests are maximised by the combination of 
functions of board chair and CEO. This theory does not favour of the separation of functions of 
CEO and chairman of the board. This theory emphasizes the concept of "unity of direction" and 
that duality provides more control. According to the assumption of the interest alignment of the 
dominant personality in the company with those of the other shareholders (Morck et al., 1988), 
we expect that the existence of a leadership structure (combination of functions) within the 
company helps the disclosure quality to increase.  
In a sample of Kenyan firms, Barako (2007) emphasized the existence of a positive and 
significant relationship between the leadership structure and the three sub-indexes of voluntary 
disclosure connected to the general and strategic information; the financial and social 
information; and the information about the board. In addition, in a sample of Tunisian firms, 
Haniffa and Cooke (2002) and Chakroun and Matoussi (2012) found a positive and significant 
relationship between the leadership structure and the extent of voluntary disclosure. 
We should mention that the positive sign on duality in position was in contradiction to   previous 
studies (i.e. Laksmana, 2008; Forker, 1992; Eng and Mak, 2003; Gul and Leung, 2004) which 
drew on the agency theory and argued that CEO duality was associated negatively with 
corporate voluntary disclosure. We supposed that the stewardship theory and the assumption of 
interest alignment of the dominant personality with those of the other shareholders in the 
company were suitable for the Tunisian context. Then, we predicted a positive association 
between disclosure quality and leadership structure. 
H 3:  Compared to other firms, the quality of disclosure is higher in firms where there is a 
leadership structure than in the other firms. 
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The stewardship theory is a collaborative approach which focuses on the board’s role of service 
and administrators are called to advise and stimulate business strategy. Therefore, the social 
and personal relationships between administrators and the CEO foster collaboration and 
strengthen the management (Donaldson and Davis, 1991). Consequently, according to this 
theory, the shareholders-administrators tend to enhance the disclosure quality in order to clear 
themselves from the other shareholders (non-administrators) and to demonstrate that they do 
not transfer the company’s wealth to their own accounts. Similarly, based on the assumption of 
alignment of interests, when administrators hold a significant part in the company, ownership 
and management are held by the same people whose interests converge with those of the non-
administrator shareholders. Disclosure quality in the annual reports is of major interest for these 
non-administrator shareholders. 
In accordance with the stewardship theory (Donaldson and Davis, 1991) and the assumption of 
interest alignment of the controlling shareholders with those of the other shareholders in the 
firm (Morck et al., 1988), we expect that the managerial ownership helps the disclosure quality 
to increase. More specifically, the greater the part held by the shareholders-administrators is 
important, the weaker the divergences of interests become between them and the other 
shareholders. Namely, when administrators hold a significant part of capital; ownership and 
management are held by the same persons whose interests converge with those of the non-
administrator shareholders interested in the quality of disclosure. Therefore, we expect that 
increases in the disclosure quality in the annual reports correspond with increases in managerial 
ownership. A high managerial ownership can help increase the company’s disclosure quality 
(Li and Qi, 2008). In the Tunisian context, Chakroun and Matoussi (2012)  found, also, a 
positive and significant relationship between the managerial ownership and the extent of 
voluntary disclosure. 
H 4: There is a positive relationship between the managerial ownership and the quality of 
disclosure 
Agency problems type II (which are caused by the conflicts between shareholders-directors and 
non-director shareholders) tend to be intense in the family controlled firms. In fact, family 
members seem unlikely to take into account the interests of the minority non director 
shareholders to obtain high quality financial information.   
In a family business, the members of the family are involved in its management and have a 
precise knowledge about their business. We expect that these members do not promote high 
quality of information. Therefore, compared to other firms, family controlled firms are expected 
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to disclose information of low quality. Indeed, Chau and Gray (2002) and Chen et al. (2006) 
argued that family controlled firms provided less voluntary information than the non-family 
ones. Chakroun and Matoussi (2012) showed, also, that, compared to other companies, the 
extent of voluntary disclosure by family controlled firms was not linked closely to the 
mandatory one. 
H 5:  Compared to other firms, the disclosure quality is lower in family controlled firms. 
3. Research Methodology 
3.1. Sample Selection and Data 
This research focused on data of all non-financial sector companies (industrial and of services) 
listed on the Tunisian Stock Exchange (TSE) and observed in the years 2007-2008. We mention 
that the number of all listed firms on the TSE was 51 in 2007 and 50 in 2008. This difference 
in the number of listed firms was explained by two new introductions and three radiations. 
We focused on listed companies because they were particularly careful about their disclosure 
policies. We excluded financial institutions due to the specificity of the disclosure of the 
financial institutions and because their annual reports differed from those of non-financial firms 
(Schleicher and Walker, 2010). We included all non-financial firms in our analysis; however,  
for 2008, we  could not obtain the annual reports of two firms. The number of firms observed 
in 2008 was 28 whilst, in 2007, their number was 26. This gave us a sample of 54 firm-year 
observations. We chose the period 2007-2008 because it is quite close to the promulgation of 
the Law No. 2005-96 concerning the strengthening of financial security. As mentioned, this 
Law calls firms to enhance their quantity and quality of disclosure and it is predicted that these 
consequences will be observed a few years thereafter.   
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
In order to assess the disclosure quality we used a manual content analysis on the annual reports. 
We consulted the annual reports of the companies which we collected from the Financial 
Market Council and the stockbrokers in the market since they were not downloadable directly 
through the Internet. We collected our data for the characteristics of the companies and the 
corporate governance mechanisms from the TSE website (http://www.bvmt.com.tn/) and the 
companies’ annual reports. 
3.2. Measurement Method to assess the Disclosure Quality 
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In Tunisia, there are no subjective ratings for disclosure quality. Beest et al. (2009) developed 
the method selected to assess the disclosure quality. It was applicable to the hard copies of our 
sample’s annual reports. In fact, Beest et al. (2009) produced a comprehensive measure to 
operationalize the fundamental and to enhance the qualitative characteristic of annual reports’ 
information.  
We assessed a score which represented a proxy of the disclosure quality of the 54 annual reports. 
We based the operationalization of the qualitative characteristics of reporting information on a 
19 item index of which 3 were related to relevance; 5 to faithful representation; 4 to 
understandability; 6 to comparability; and 1 to timeliness. We dropped two items from Beest et 
al.’s (2009) list of items; these were neither applicable nor relevant to the Tunisian firms 
(Relevance 39 and Understandability 410). In fact, we adapted Beest et al.’s (2009) method to 
the Tunisian context since Botosan (2004) stated that the researcher ought to recognize that 
effective frameworks for assessing disclosure quality were likely to be context specific. By 
using predefined 5 point Likert scales, we coded the reports on the number of items. In order to 
ensure consistency in the scoring, we read all annual reports twice. As recommended by 
Botosan (2004) and by Jonas and Blanchet (2000), Beest et al.’s (2009) measure captured all 
the qualitative characteristics of information discussed in the conceptual frameworks for IASB 
financial reporting (IASB 2008) 11  and the FASB (FASB 1980). These were namely: the 
fundamental qualitative characteristics (i.e. relevance and faithful representation)12; and the 
enhancing qualitative characteristics (i.e. understandability, comparability and timeliness)13. 
These qualitative characteristics were mentioned by the Tunisian accounting conceptual 
framework (1997).  
Beest et al. (2009) used multiple items which were drawn from existing measurement items 
developed already in previous studies (e.g. Jonas and Blanchet, 2000). Appendix A provides an 
overview of the 19 measured items which we used to operationalize the fundamental and to 
enhance the qualitative characteristics. The Appendix includes, also, the measurement scales 
used to assess the values of the distinct items. 
In order to compute a standardized outcome for each qualitative characteristic (sub scores), the 
scores on the related items were added and divided by the total number of items. We measured 
a sub score for each qualitative characteristic and, then, we measured a score which represented 
an aggregate measure for the disclosure quality. The aggregated disclosure quality score was a 
function of five measures (sub scores) representing the quality attributes: relevance; faithful 
representation; understandability; and comparability and timeliness.  We weighted equally the 
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sub scores that composed the aggregated score because there was no reason to prioritize one 
attribute over the others. Indeed, the ASB (2006) valued all attributes equally. Following Beest 
et al. (2009), we discuss these qualitative characteristics as follows:  
Relevance 
Information is considered relevant “if it is capable of making a difference in the decisions made 
by users” (IASB, 2010, p. 17).The IFRS provide, also, a more specific definition of relevance: 
“financial information is capable of making a difference in decisions if it has predictive value, 
confirmatory value or both” (IASB, 2010, p. 17). Information would have a predictive value “if 
it can be used as an input to processes employed by users to predict future outcomes” (IFRS 
2010b, p. 17). Information would have a confirmatory value “if it provides feedback about 
(confirms or changes) previous evaluations” (IFRS 2010b, p. 17). Usually, information, which 
has predictive value, has confirmatory value. 
Faithful representation 
Faithful representation is the second fundamental qualitative characteristic as elaborated in the 
conceptual frameworks. In order to faithfully represent economic phenomena which the 
information purports to represent, annual reports must be complete, neutral, and free from 
material error (IASB, 2010). Economic phenomena, represented in the annual report, are 
“economic resources and obligations and the transactions and other events and circumstances 
that change them” (IASB, 2006). 
Understandability 
The IASB (2010) defined understandability as the quality of information that enabled users to 
comprehend its meaning. The IASB (2010) argued that understandability was enhanced when 
information was classified, characterized and presented clearly and concisely.  
Comparability 
Comparability is considered to be a quality attribute of information which enables users to 
identify similarities in, and differences between, two sets of economic phenomena (IASB, 
2010). In addition, as a quality attribute, comparability helps users to identify the main trends 
and the analysis of a firm’s performance over time (ASB, 2006). 
Timeliness 
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Timeliness means “having information available to decision-makers before it loses its capacity 
of influencing decisions” (IASB, 2010). Timeliness refers to the time it takes to reveal the 
information and, in general, is related to decision usefulness (IASB, 2010). 
3.3. Measurement Method to assess the Voluntary Disclosure Quantity 
Healy and Palepu (2001), who examined corporate disclosure extensively, stated that one of the 
limitations of the studies on voluntary disclosure was the difficulty in measuring its extent or 
quantity. We based our measure of disclosure quantity on the Botosan (1997)14's index adapted 
to the Tunisian context (Appendix B).We dropped eight items which were not disclosed by any 
company in our sample. Based on the previous studies to identify the information expected by 
the users of the annual reports and on the Guide of the Annual Report of the Tunisian 
Companies published in 2009, we added three categories of information, namely: information 
on intangible assets; social and environmental information; and information on governance.  
We used an un-weighted and weighted index based on the views of financial analysts and 
portfolio managers. According to the un-weighted approach, an item took "1" if disclosed and 
"0" otherwise. We measured the extent of disclosure by the ratio between the company’s score 
and its maximum possible score for not penalizing it for non-disclosing items when they were 
irrelevant to its activities. 
UN DISi = 

72
1J
x ji / Mi 
With: Mi: maximum number of items of which disclosure was possible for company "i»;          Mi 
≤ 72, x ij= "1" if jth item was disclosed and = "0" otherwise. 
It should be noted that for the weighting of the disclosure quantity score, we based it on data 
from an investigation through a questionnaire on a sample of 40 Tunisian financial analysts and 
Tunisian portfolio managers 15  (Chakroun and Matoussi, 2012). This method reflected the 
relative utility of each item and admitted that all items provided a different utility to the selected 
user of the annual report. The respondents were asked to rate the usefulness which they attached 
to the items on a5 points Likert scale. The values, attached to the items which could be disclosed 
in the annual reports, were (1=Not useful at all), (2=Little useful), (3=Somewhat useful), 
(4=Useful) and (5=Very useful). According to the weighted approach, an item took its "weight" 
if it was disclosed and "0" otherwise. The weight represented the arithmetic average of the 
points awarded by the respondents to the item16.  
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W_DISi =  

72
1J
x ij*P j  / 

Mi
J 1
P j 
With: M i: number of maximum items whose disclosure was possible for company ‘i’; 
M i ≤ 72; x ij = ‘1’ If the j th item was disclosed and = ‘0’ otherwise; 
P j: j 
th item weight (arithmetic average of the points awarded by the analysts to the item). 
3.4. The Determinants of Disclosure Quantity and Disclosure Quality 
We examined the extent to which disclosure quality and disclosure quantity were correlated 
and, hence, the former could be used as a proxy for the latter. In addition, we examined the 
extent to which both disclosure quality and disclosure quantity shared the same determinants. 
We compared the determinants of the disclosure quantity with the determinants of the 
disclosure quality, especially since previous studies showed that the determinants of disclosure 
quality and disclosure quantity were not identical (e.g. Anis et al., 2012). We used the following 
regression model to examine the determinants of disclosure quality and quantity: 
DIS i = β0 + β1 YEAR i + β2 INDB i + β3 SIB i + β4 COMFUN i + β5 MAN i + β6 FAM i              + 
β7 AGE i + β8 QAU i + β9 LSIZE + εi                           
Where;  
DIS = disclosure quality (quantity).  We measured disclosure quality through the fundamental 
qualitative characteristics (relevance and faithful representation) and by enhancing qualitative 
characteristics (understandability, comparability and timeliness) qualitative information 
characteristics and their aggregation.  We measured disclosure quantity by a weighted and an 
un-weighted score. YEAR = 1 in 2008 and = 0 in 2007. INDB was the independence of the 
board. SIB was the size of the board. COMFUN was the combination of functions of General 
Manager and Chairman. MAN was managerial ownership. FAM was family control. AGE was 
the age of the company. QAU was the quality of auditor, and LSIZE was the size of 
business.Table 2 shows the definition of each of the variables and the data source. 
TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
4. Descriptive Statistics 
Firstly, we present the descriptive statistics of the proxies of the disclosure quality and, then, 
we present the proxies of the disclosure quantity. Afterwards, we present a summary of the 
descriptive statistics of the independent variables. 
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Table 3 shows that the means of the sub scores of disclosure quality, namely: relevance 
(R_DISQUA); faithful representation (FR_DISQUA); understandability (U_DISQUA); and 
comparability (C_DISQUA). These were close with a little superiority to (U_DISQUA). We 
noted that the mean observed for the (C_DISQUA) sub score was relatively low and was of the 
order of 2.70. In other words, in our sample, the firms tended to be weakly concerned by the 
qualitative characteristic of comparability. The highest mean was observed for the sub score of 
timeliness (T_DISQUA).Then, it appeared that timeliness was the highest qualitative 
characteristic for the sampled companies. The mean and median of the aggregate disclosure 
quality score (DISQUA) increased to 2.90 and 2.86 respectively. In addition, its minimum was 
1.95 and its maximum was 4. This result indicated that the disclosure quality of the sampled 
companies tended to have a medium level since the values of the mean and the median were 
close to the neutral value “3”. 
Furthermore, by examining the means and medians values of the disclosure quantity scores 
W_DIS and UN_DIS), we noted that these values were very close. Such results meant that there 
was no difference between the weighted and un-weighted measures of the voluntary disclosure 
quantity. 
Moreover, we could see that, generally, the boards of directors were not independent: the mean 
and median of the INDB variable reached 28 % and 29 % respectively. The standard deviation 
of this variable was very close to its mean and increased to 23 %. This could be explained by 
the variability between the sampled companies regarding the independence of their boards. The 
review of the SIB variable revealed that the boards of directors tended to be large. The mean of 
this variable was 8.81 and its median was 9.50. For the COMFUN variable, we noted that 62% 
of the sampled companies had a Chairman who, at the same time, was the General Manager. 
The mean and the median of the MAN variable were respectively 59 % and 63%. These results 
enable us to ascertain that the sampled firms were characterized by a very strong property of 
administrators. For variable FAM, we could say that more than a third of the observations 
represented family-controlled companies. This high proportion reflected a characteristic of the 
Tunisian economic tissue which was the dominance of the family-controlled businesses. 
By looking at the control variables, we could see that the mean of the AGE variable increased 
to 8.75. For the QAU variable, we noted that only 33 % of the observed companies had a « Big 
4 » auditor. Finally, the mean of the variable size of business, as measured by the natural 
logarithm of total assets, was 18.01. 
TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
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5. Empirical Results and Discussion 
5.1. Correlation Analyses 
Table 4 shows a significant positive (negative) correlation between the disclosure quality score 
and the managerial ownership (the independence of the board). More specifically, Pearson's 
correlation coefficients between the disclosure quality and the managerial ownership and 
between the disclosure quality and the independence of the board stood respectively at 34 % 
and 33 % and they were significant at 5%. In addition, this Table shows some significant 
correlations between some independent variables such as, on the one hand, the correlations 
between the size of the board, and, on the other hand, the independence of the board and the 
size of business,. Hence, these results pushed us to conduct further multicollinearity analyses.  
TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE 
Moreover, Table 5 shows that the highest correlations between the sub scores of disclosure 
quality were observed, on the one hand, between the sub score of understandability 
(U_DISQUA) and the sub score of comparability (C_DISQUA), and, on the other hand, 
between the sub score of faithful representation (FR_DISQUA) and the sub scores of 
understandability (U_DISQUA) and of comparability (C_DISQUA),.  
We observed, also, with the exception of the timeliness sub score, a strong and positive 
correlation between the scores of disclosure quantity and all the sub scores of disclosure quality. 
This indicated that disclosure quantity and qualitative characteristics of information were 
correlated and disclosure quantity could be a predictor of disclosure quality. Consequently, the 
prevailing assumption in the literature was that disclosure quantity and quality were correlated 
and, therefore, quantity represented a proper proxy for quality which could be precise and ought 
to be tested by multivariate analyses. Furthermore, the correlation between the weighted and 
un-weighted disclosure quantity scores stood significantly at 99%. This result could be 
interpreted by the fact of the non-reliability of the weighting of items. 
Finally, we focused on the correlation between the quantity and quality scores. Pearson 
correlation showed a significant positive correlation (0.71) between the quality and the quantity 
scores (weighted and un-weighted). As discussed earlier, it seemed that the disclosure quantity 
could be a proper proxy of disclosure quality. Moreover, the correlation analysis yielded logical 
results about the strong and significant correlations between the aggregate score of disclosure 
quality and all its sub scores.  
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TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE 
5.2. Results and Discussion of the Multivariate Analyses 
5.2.1. Results Related to the Multiple Regression Models of Disclosure Quality 
Before explaining the results of the OLS regression analysis, we tested the model on 
multicollinearity. Table 4 shows that, for each of the variables, the Variance Inflation Factor 
(VIF) was smaller than the threshold value "3"; this indicated the absence of the 
multicollinearity problem.   
Table 6 Panel A shows that INDB was negative and significant. Then, we could conclude that 
this result did not support the predictions of the agency theory. However, consistent with 
Chakroun and Matoussi (2012) and Jouini (2013), this result allowed us to disprove hypothesis 
H 1. This substitutive relationship might be explained by the fact that companies would not 
improve both disclosure quality and board independence at the same time; however, they would 
chose strategically to improve one at the expense of the other. Besides, with a high value, the 
coefficient of MAN variable was positive and significant. In this complementary relationship, 
each mechanism strengthened the other. This result allowed us to confirm hypothesis H 4 and 
to support the predictions of stewardship theory and the assumption of the alignment of the 
interests of the shareholders-administrators with those of the other shareholders (Morck et al., 
1988).  Consequently, the administrators (stewards) were considered to be members of an 
organization where they contributed to the success and achievement of objectives (Donaldson 
and Davis, 1991). The coefficient of the SIB variable had the positive expected sign but it is 
insignificant. Likewise, the coefficient of the COMFUN variable had the positive expected sign 
but it was insignificant. Also, the coefficient of the FAM variable had the negative expected 
sign but it was insignificant. In conclusion, the insignificant coefficients of the variables SIB, 
COMFUN and FAM allowed us to invalidate our hypotheses H 2, H 3 and H 5.  
TABLE 6 (PANEL A) ABOUT HERE 
Furthermore, by comparing the R2 of the regressions of Table 6 Panel B and Panel C, it appeared 
that these values were significantly higher for the regressions with the fundamental qualitative 
characteristics as dependent variables (Panel B) than for the regressions with the enhancing 
qualitative characteristics as dependent variables (Panel C).     
Table 6 Panel B shows that there was no significant relationship between the corporate 
characteristics and the disclosure quality score on relevance. However, it shows a negative and 
significant relationship between the board independence and the disclosure quality score on 
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faithful representation and a positive and significant relationship between the managerial 
ownership and this score. These results are similar to those found for the model with the 
aggregate score of disclosure quality as dependent variable. 
TABLE 6 (PANEL B) ABOUT HERE 
We can say that the positive significant relation between, on the one hand, MAN; and the 
disclosure quality sub scores on faithful representation (Table 6 Panel B) and, on the other hand, 
on understandability (Table 6 Panel C); allowed us to strengthen the  acceptance of hypothesis 
H 4. Also, we noted the negative relationship between, on the other hand, INDB and the 
disclosure quality based on the sub scores of faithful representation and, on the other hand, 
between understandability and comparability led us to strengthen the rejection of hypothesis H 
1. However, based on the sub score of timeliness  and as expected in hypothesis H 2 (Table 6 
Panel C) we observed a positive and highly significant (at 1%) relationship between the size of 
the board and the disclosure quality. This result enabled us to partially confirm hypothesis H 2. 
Besides, in Table 6,  the results of all the regressions provided strong support that there were 
no relationships between, on the one hand, the board’s leadership structure ; the family control; 
the age of the company; the quality of auditor; and the size of business; and, on the other hand, 
all the disclosure quality scores. 
TABLE 6 (PANEL C) ABOUT HERE 
5.2.2. Results Related to the Disclosure Quantity Determinants versus Disclosure 
Quality Determinants 
By comparing the R2 of the regressions as shown in Tables 6 and 7, it appeared that these values 
were significantly lower for the regressions with the disclosure quantity scores as dependent 
variables than for the regressions with the disclosure quality scores as dependent variables. 
Next, we present a comparison of the coefficients of the regressions of Tables 6 and 7.  
Table 7 shows that only the coefficient of the INDB variable was significant. The negative sign 
of this coefficient was similar to that found for the regression with the aggregate disclosure 
quality score as dependent variable; however, its value was lower. In addition, with the 
exception of the coefficient of the INDB variable, all the coefficients for the independent 
variables for the regressions with the disclosure quantity scores as dependent variables were 
insignificant. This was similar to those found in the regression with the aggregate disclosure 
quality score as dependent variable. Also, many previous studies found insignificant 
relationships between corporate disclosure and mechanisms of corporate governance. As an 
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illustration, both Ho and Wong (2001)17 and Cheng and Courtney (2006)18 found no significant 
association between CEO duality and voluntary disclosure. However, we noted that, while it 
was strongly positive and connected significantly to the disclosure quality score, the coefficient 
of the MAN variable was weakly positive and not connected significantly to the disclosure 
quantity scores.  
In conclusion, we mention that, on the one hand, we found similarities and differences in the 
relationship between the corporate governance mechanisms and, on the other hand, between the 
disclosure quantity and the disclosure quality. This result could be interpreted by the fact that 
there was partial correlation between disclosure quantity and the disclosure quality. Hence, the 
use of disclosure quantity as a proxy for the quality could be false. Our findings are consistent 
with the work of (Marston and Shrives, 1991; Botosan, 2004; Beattie et al., 2004). Besides, our 
results seem to be inconsistent with the results of Hussainey et al., 2003) and Hassan and 
Marston, 2010) which suggested that quantity was a proper proxy for the quality of disclosure.  
TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE 
6. Conclusion 
We measured the quality of corporate disclosure for a sample of Tunisian companies within the 
time period 2007-2008. We examined, also, the degree to which disclosure quality and quantity 
shared the same determinants. We used a new methodology proposed by Beest and Braam 
(2012) to measure the quality of corporate disclosure. A novel feature of this methodology is 
that it is applicable to any context and is not restricted to English speaking countries. Our 
analyses show that [a] some [not all] corporate governance mechanisms affect the quality of 
corporate disclosure: On the one hand, the effect of board independence on disclosure quality 
is consistent with a substitutive relationship. Indeed, independent administrators may be 
regarded as stranger administrators to the firm without being actually independent or may be 
regarded as advisors to the CEO. On the other hand, the effect of managerial ownership on 
disclosure quality shows a complementary relationship. In fact, (a) the shareholders-
administrators, who have a close idea about the business, can tend to improve the quality of 
disclosure in order to clear themselves from the other shareholders; and [b] the determinants of 
disclosure quality and quantity are dissimilar.  
The measurement of disclosure quality is still an open question and represents one of the main 
unresolved and debated issues in disclosure literature. Consequently, it includes many aspects 
about the firm and cannot be identified as referring only to the items considered in this study. 
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In addition, we considered our sample to be very small and this was due to the small size of the 
Tunisian population. Moreover, we believe that there is scope for further refinement of the 
process of calculating the quality of corporate disclosure in annual reports. We used a labour-
intensive approach to measure disclosure quality.  However, the use of a computerised content 
analysis approach should save time and effort. Also, the involvement of experts in linguistics, 
in determining relevant key words, may improve the ability of the computer software packages 
to calculate the quality of corporate disclosure.  However, the potential contribution from the 
application of linguistic methods remains an area for future research since it is possible that 
there will be significant difficulties in overcoming some of the classificatory problems of some 
statements.  However, notwithstanding these limitations, this study shows interesting results 
which can be useful for managers, regulators, investment professionals, and market participants 
as a whole. 
Finally, disclosure theories show that a rich information environment and low information 
asymmetry should lead to desirable consequences. These include: [a] an improvement in the 
investors’ ability to anticipate future earnings; [b] an improvement in the analysts’ accuracy of 
earnings forecasts; and [c] a reduction in the firms’ cost of capital. Therefore, it would be 
interesting to extend this study by exploring the economic consequences of disclosure quality. 
In addition, further research might examine the potential endogenous or simultaneous 
relationship between disclosure quality and quantity (substitution or complementary 
relationships).   
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Table 1. Distribution of observations by industry and year 
Sector of activity 2007 2008 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS 1 1 
CONSUMER SERVICES 3 4 
TRAVEL AND LEISURE 2 2 
HEALTH 1 1 
CONSUMER GOODS 4 4 
FOOD AND DRINKS 3 3 
HOUSEHOLD PRODUCTS AND PERSONAL CARE 2 2 
BUILDINGS AND BUILDING MATERIALS 4 4 
INDUSTRIAL GOODS AND SERVICES 2 2 
CHEMISTRY 2 3 
OIL AND GAS 1 1 
RAW MATERIALS 1 1 
TOTAL 26 28 
 
 
 
 
Table 2. Summary of the measures of explanatory variables 
Explanatory  
variables  
Indicators Measures used and Availability 
29 
 
 
Independence of the 
board 
 
INDB 
(Number of outside administrators /Total number of administrators)*100 
(the website of the TSE) 
Size of the board SIB 
Total number of administrators 
(the website of the TSE) 
Combination of 
functions of GM and CH 
COMFUN 
= 1 if a person combine the functions GM and CH and = 0 if not 
 (the website of the TSE) 
Managerial ownership MAN 
The percentage of shares held by the administrators 
 (the website of the TSE) 
Family control FAM 
= 1 if the firm is controlled by a family and = 0 if not 
(the website of the TSE) 
Age of the company AGE 
Duration of quotation of the company out of Stock Exchange in years 
(the website of the TSE) 
Quality of auditor QAU 
= 1 if the firm is audited at least by a « Big 4 » and = 0 if not 
(the website of the TSE) 
Size of business LSIZE 
Log (Total assets) 
(companies' annual reports) 
Year YEAR = 1 in 2008 and = 0 in 2007 
 
 
 
Table 3. Summary of the descriptive statistics 
    Indicators N Mean Median Standard 
deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
DISQUA 54 2.90 2.86 0.53 1.95 4 
R_DISQUA 54 2.90 2.83 0.92 1.33 5 
FR_DISQUA 54 2.84 2.8 0.52 1.8 4 
U_DISQUA 54 2.95 3 0.71 1.5 4.25 
C_DISQUA 54 2.70 2.58 0.65 2 4 
T_DISQUA 54 4.40 4 0.49 4 5 
W_DIS 54 52.61 53.71 13.63 10.1 76.17 
UN_DIS 54 51.84 51.47 13.74 9.72 76.27 
YEAR 54 0.5 0.5 0.50 0 1 
INDB 54 0.28 0.29 0.23 0 0.77 
SIB 54 8.81 9.5 2.39 3 12 
COMFUN 54 0.62 1 0.48 0 1 
MAN 54 0.59 0.63 0.17 0 0.89 
FAM 54 0.37 0 0.48 0 1 
AGE 54 8.75 9 5.43 1 19 
QAU 54 0.33 0 0.47 0 1 
LSIZE 54 18.01 17.86 0.94 16.38 20.99 
DISQUA= Disclosure Quality Score. 
R_DISQUA= Disclosure Quality Score on Relevance. 
FR_DISQUA= Disclosure Quality Score on Faithful Representation. 
U_DISQUA= Disclosure Quality Score on Understandability. 
C_DISQUA= Disclosure Quality Score on Comparability. 
T_DISQUA= Disclosure Quality Score on Timeliness. 
W_DIS= Weighted Disclosure Quantity Score. 
UN_DIS= Unweighted Disclosure Quantity Score. 
YEAR= 1 in 2008 and = 0 in 2007. 
INDB = (Number of outside administrators / Total number of administrators)*100. 
SIB = Total number of administrators. 
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COMFUN= 1 if a person combine the functions GM and CH and = 0 if not. 
MAN = The percentage of shares held by the administrators.  
FAM= 1 if the firm is controlled by a family and = 0 if not. 
AGE = Duration of quotation of the company out of Stock Exchange in years.  
QAU= 1 if the firm is audited at least by a « Big 4 » and = 0 if not. 
LSIZE = Log (Total assets).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4. Matrix of correlation and variation inflation factors 
VIFs LSIZE AGE QAU INDB COMFUN SIB FAM MAN DISQUA  
         1 DISQUA 
1,15        1 0.34* MAN 
1.44       1 0.01 0.01 FAM 
1.98      1 -0.23 0.07 0.04 SIB 
1.24     1 -0.05 -0.12 0.21 0.20 COMFUN 
1.31    1 -0.28* 0.27* 0.05 -0.03 -0.33* INDB 
1.72   1 0.08 0.13 -0.17 0.02 -0.09 0.002 QAU 
1.84  1 0.04 0.15 -0.09 0.46* -0.49* 0.006 -0.13 AGE 
2.27 1 0.46* 0.39* 0.004 0.13 0.45* -0.27* 0.15 0.16 LSIZE 
* indicate significance at a level below 5%; Mean VIF = 1.56 
DISQUA= Disclosure Quality Score. 
MAN = The percentage of shares held by the administrators.  
FAM= 1 if the firm is controlled by a family and = 0 if not. 
SIB = Total number of administrators. 
COMFUN= 1 if a person combine the functions GM and CH and = 0 if not. 
INDB = (Number of outside administrators / Total number of administrators)*100. 
QAU= 1 if the firm is audited at least by a « Big 4 » and = 0 if not. 
AGE = Duration of quotation of the company out of Stock Exchange in years.  
LSIZE = Log (Total assets). 
 
Table 5. Matrix of correlation of the Disclosure Quality Scores and the Disclosure Quantity 
Scores 
DISQUA W_DIS UN_DIS T_DISQUA C_DISQUA U_DISQUA FR_DISQUA R_DISQUA  
       1  R_DISQUA 
      1 0.58* FR_DISQUA 
     1 0.69* 0.59* U_DISQUA 
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Table 6. Results related to the multiple regression models: Disclosure Quality 
 
 Panel B: Disclosure Quality based on the Scores of Fundamental Qualitative 
Characteristics                    (Relevance and Faithful Representation) 
R_DISQUA i = β0 + β1 YEAR i + β2 INDB i 
+ β3 SIB i + β4 COMFUN i + β5 MAN i + β6 
FR_DISQUA i = β0 + β1 YEAR i + β2 INDB 
i + β3 SIB i + β4 COMFUN i + β5 MAN i + 
    1 0.66* 0.63* 0.54* C_DISQUA 
   1 0.07 0.17 0.13 -0.039 T_DISQUA 
  1 -0.07 0.60* 0.65* 0.53* 0.63* UN_DIS 
 1 0.99* -0.07 0.60* 0.66* 0.53* 0.64* W_DIS 
1 0. 71* 0. 71* 0.13 0.85* 0.88* 0. 83* 0. 78* DISQUA 
 * indicate significance at a level below 5% 
 R_DISQUA= Disclosure Quality Score on Relevance. 
FR_DISQUA= Disclosure Quality Score on Faithful Representation. 
U_DISQUA= Disclosure Quality Score on Understandability. 
C_DISQUA= Disclosure Quality Score on Comparability. 
T_DISQUA= Disclosure Quality Score on Timeliness. 
UN_DIS= Unweighted Disclosure Quantity Score. 
W_DIS= Weighted Disclosure Quantity Score. 
DISQUA= Disclosure Quality Score. 
                     Panel A: Disclosure Quality based on the Disclosure Quality Score 
                     DISQUA i = β0 + β1 YEAR i + β2 INDB i + β3 SIB i + β4 COMFUN i + β5 MAN i + β6 FAM i + 
β7 AGE i + β8 QAU i + β9 LSIZE + εi                           
 Coefficients t-statistic P>|t| 
Constant 1.115 0.7 0.489 
 
YEAR 0.171 1.18 
 
0.243 
 
INDB -0.744* -2 
 
0.051 
 
SIB 0.032 0.66 
 
0.513 
 
COMFUN 0.005 0.03 
 
0.973 
 
MAN 0.823** 2.09 
 
0.042 
FAM -0.032 
 
-0.18 
 
0.859 
 
AGE -0.024 -1.51 
 
0.137 
 
QAU  0.036  0.19 
 
0.852 
 
LSIZE 0.074 0.7 0.486 
 
Fisher Test                  0.0236 
R-squared                   29.99%   
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FAM i + β7 AGE i  + β8 QAU i + β9 LSIZE 
+ εi                           
β6 FAM i + β7 AGE i  + β8 QAU i + β9 
LSIZE + εi                           
Coefficients t-statistic P>|t| Coefficients t-statistic P>|t| 
Constant 0.307 
 
0.1 0.918 
 
2.456 
 
1.65 
 
0.106 
 
YEAR 0.366 
 
1.35 
 
0.184 
 
0.025 
 
0.19 
 
0.852 
 
INDB -0.002 
 
-0.31 
 
0.761 
 
-0.008** 
 
-2.33 
 
0.025 
 
SIB -0.057 
 
-0.64 
 
0.528 
 
0.072 
 
1.62 
 
0.111 
 
COMFUN 0.005 
 
0.02 
 
0.983 
 
-0.026 
 
-0.2 
 
0.843 
 
MAN 0.009 
 
1.4 
 
0.169 
 
0.011*** 
 
3.48 
 
0.001 
 
FAM -0.063 
 
-0.2 
 
0.845 
 
-0.284 
 
-1.67 
 
0.102 
 
AGE -0.050 
 
-1.66 
 
0.103 
 
-0.024 
 
-1.39 
 
0.173 
 
QAU -0.325 
 
-1.02 
 
0.314 
 
0.253 
 
1.46 
 
0.151 
 
LSIZE 0.165 
 
0.86 
 
0.396 
 
-0.024 -0.25 
 
0.803 
 
Fisher Test                                         1.43                                                                      3.09 
R-squared                                        30.10%                                                                24.20% 
Table 6. (Continued) 
 Panel C: Disclosure Quality based on the Scores of Enhancing Qualitative Characteristics 
(Understandability, Comparability and Timeliness ) 
U_DISQUA i = β0 + β1 YEAR i 
+ β2 INDB i + β3 SIB i + β4 
COMFUN i + β5 MAN i + β6 
FAM i + β7 AGE i  + β8 QAU i 
+ β9 LSIZE + εi                           
C_DISQUA i = β0 + β1 YEAR i 
+ β2 INDB i + β3 SIB i + β4 
COMFUN i + β5 MAN i + β6 
FAM i + β7 AGE i  + β8 QAU i 
+ β9 LSIZE + εi                           
T_DISQUA i = β0 + β1 YEAR i 
+ β2 INDB i + β3 SIB i + β4 
COMFUN i + β5 MAN i + β6 
FAM i + β7 AGE i  + β8 QAU i 
+ β9 LSIZE + εi                           
Coefficients t-
statistic 
P>|t| Coefficients t-
statistic 
P>|t| Coefficients t-
statistic 
P>|t| 
Constant 0.492 
 
0.27 
 
0.788 
 
0.621 
 
0.31 
 
0.756 
 
6.694*** 
 
3.39 
 
0.001 
 
YEAR 0.104 
 
0.53 
 
0.595 
 
0.196 
 
1.14 
 
0.262 
 
0.065 
 
0.47 
 
0.639 
 
INDB -0.008* 
 
-1.75 
 
0.086 
 
-0.011** 
 
-2.21 
 
0.033 
 
-0.003 
 
-1.39 
 
0.170 
 
SIB 0.057 
 
0.91 
 
0.369 
 
0.032 
 
0.49 
 
0.629 
 
0.120*** 
 
3.89 
 
0.000 
 
COMFUN 0.167 
 
0.74 
 
0.462 
 
-0.132 
 
-0.68 
 
0.499 
 
-0.137 
 
-0.98 
 
0.332 
 
MAN 0.011* 
 
1.98 
 
0.054 
 
0.005 
 
1.25 
 
0.217 
 
0.006 
 
1.55 
 
0.128 
 
FAM 0.064 
 
0.25 
 
0.806 
 
0.136 
 
0.69 
 
0.493 
 
0.061 
 
0.38 
 
0.703 
 
AGE -0.019 
 
-0.88 
 
0.381 
 
-0.010 
 
-0.65 
 
0.516 
 
-0.017 
 
-1.08 
 
0.284 
 
QAU 0.109 
 
0.49 
 
0.629 
 
0.050 
 
0.17 
 
0.863 
 
0.297 
 
1.47 
 
0.148 
 
LSIZE 0.082 
 
0.67 
 
0.508 
 
0.100 
 
0.79 
 
0.435 
 
-0.197 
 
-1.58 
 
0.121 
 
Fisher Test                   
R-squared                    
2.36
12.50% 
1.84 
9.30% 
4.27 
9.90% 
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Table 7. Results related to the multiple regression models: Disclosure Quantity based on 
Unweightedand Weighted Disclosure Quantity Scores 
 
 
  
UN_DIS i = β0 + β1 YEARi + β2 INDBi + β3 
SIBi + β4COMFUNi+ β5MANi + β6 FAMi+ 
β7AGEi  + β8QAUi+ β9LSIZE + εi 
W_DIS i = β0 + β1 YEARi + β2 INDBi + β3 
SIBi + β4COMFUNi+ β5MANi + β6 
FAMi+ β7AGEi  + β8QAUi+ β9LSIZE + εi 
Coefficients t-statistic P>|t| Coefficients t-statistic P>|t| 
Constant 41.770 
 
1 
 
0.321 
 
48.018 
 
1.22 
 
0.23 
 
YEAR 0.682 
 
0.17 
 
0.864 
 
1.100 
 
0.28 
 
0.781 
 
INDB -0.169* 
 
-1.98 
 
0.054 
 
-0.162 
 
-1.93* 
 
0.061 
 
SIB 0.568 
 
0.52 
 
0.604 
 
0.651 
 
0.6 
 
0.549 
 
COMFUN 5.773 
 
1.39 
 
0.172 
 
5.560 
 
1.33 
 
0.189 
 
MAN 0.053 
 
0.48 
 
0.634 
 
0.053 
 
0.48 
 
0.633 
 
FAM 1.642 
 
0.38 
 
0.709 
 
1.789 
 
0.40 
 
0.689 
 
AGE -0.457 
 
-0.95 
 
0.349 
 
-0.527 
 
-1.07 
 
0.290 
 
QAU -1.976 
 
-0.46 
 
0.646 
 
-1.120 
 
-0.27 
 
0.787 
 
LSIZE 0.378 
 
0.15 
 
0.885 
 
0.031 
 
0.01 
 
0.990 
 
Fisher Test                                          1.65                                                                      1.68 
R-squared                                          5.92%                                                                   5.90% 
* indicates significance at a level below 10%  
*, ** and *** indicate significance at a level below 10%, 5% et 1% respectively 
DISQUA= Disclosure Quality Score. 
R_DISQUA= Disclosure Quality Score on Relevance. 
FR_DISQUA= Disclosure Quality Score on Faithful Representation. 
U_DISQUA= Disclosure Quality Score on Understandability. 
C_DISQUA= Disclosure Quality Score on Comparability. 
T_DISQUA= Disclosure Quality Score on Timeliness. 
YEAR= 1 in 2008 and = 0 in 2007. 
INDB = (Number of outside administrators / Total number of administrators)*100. 
SIB = Total number of administrators.  
COMFUN= 1 if a person combine the functions GM and CH and = 0 if not. 
MAN = The percentage of shares held by the administrators.  
FAM= 1 if the firm is controlled by a family and = 0 if not. 
AGE = Duration of quotation of the company out of Stock Exchange in years.  
QAU= 1 if the firm is audited at least by a « Big 4 » and = 0 if not. 
LSIZE = Log (Total assets). 
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UN_DIS= Unweighted Disclosure Quantity Score. 
W_DIS= Weighted Disclosure Quantity Score. 
YEAR= 1 in 2008 and = 0 in 2007. 
INDB = (Number of outside administrators / Total number of administrators)*100. 
SIB = Total number of administrators. 
COMFUN= 1 if a person combine the functions GM and CH and = 0 if not. 
MAN = The percentage of shares held by the administrators.  
FAM= 1 if the firm is controlled by a family and = 0 if not. 
AGE = Duration of quotation of the company out of Stock Exchange in years.  
QAU= 1 if the firm is audited at least by a « Big 4 » and = 0 if not. 
LSIZE = Log (Total assets). 
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Appendix A: Overview of the measurement items and the measurement scales used to operationalize the qualitative characteristics 
(Source: Beest et al. 2009)  
Relevance 
Question no. Question Operationalization Concept Literature 
R1 To what extent does the presence 
of the forward-looking statement 
help forming expectations and 
predictions concerning the future 
of the company? 
 
1 = No forward-looking information 
2 = Forward-looking information not in an 
apart subsection 
3 = Apart subsection 
4 = Extensive predictions 
5 = Extensive predictions useful for making 
expectation 
Predictive value e.g. McDaniel et al., 2002; 
Jonas and Blanchet, 2000 
R2 To what extent does the presence 
of non-financial information in 
terms of business opportunities 
and risks complement the 
financial information? 
 
1 = No non-financial information 
2 = Little non-financial information, no useful 
for forming expectations 
3 = Useful non-financial information 
4 = Useful non-financial information, helpful 
for developing expectations 
5 = Non-financial information presents 
additional information which helps developing 
expectations 
Predictive value e.g. Jonas and Blanchet, 
2000 
R3 To what extent do the reported 
results provide feedback to users 
of the annual report as to how 
various market events and 
significant transactions affected 
the company? 
1 = No feedback 
2 = Little feedback on the past 
3 = Feedback in present  
4 = Feedback helps understanding how events 
and transactions influenced the company 
5 = Comprehensive feedback 
Confirmatory value e.g. Jonas and Blanchet, 
2000 
Faithful representation 
Question no. Question Operationalization Concept Literature 
F1 To what extent are valid 
arguments provided to support the 
decision for certain assumptions 
and estimates in the annual report? 
1 = Only described estimations  
2 = General explanation 
3 = Special explanation of estimations 
4 = Special explanation, formulas explained 
etc. 
Verifiability e.g. Jonas and Blanchet, 
2000 
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5 = Comprehensive argumentation 
F2 To what extent does the company 
base its choice for certain 
accounting principles on valid 
arguments? 
1 = Changes nor explained 
2 = Minimum explanation 
3 = Explained why 
4 = Explained why + consequences  
5 = No changes or comprehensive explanation 
Verification e.g. Jonas and Blanchet, 
2000 
F3 To what extent does the company, 
in the discussion of the annual 
results, highlight the positive 
events as well as the negative 
events? 
 
1 = Negative events only mentioned in 
footnotes 
2 = Emphasize on positive events 
3 = Emphasize on positive events, but 
negative events are mentioned, no negative 
events occurred 
4 = Balance pos/neg events 
5 = Impact of pos/neg events is also explained 
Neutrality e.g. Razaee, 2003; Cohen et 
al., 2004 
F4 Which type of auditors’ report is 
included in the annual report? 
 
1 = Adverse opinion 
2 = Disclaimer of opinion 
3 = Qualified opinion 
4 = Unqualified opinion: Financial figures  
5 = Unqualified opinion: Financial figures + 
internal control 
Free from material 
error, verification, 
neutrality, and 
completeness 
e.g. Maines and Wahlen, 
2006 
 
F5 To what extent does the company 
provide information on corporate 
governance? 
1 = No description CG 
2 = Information on CG limited, not in an apart 
subsection 
3 = Apart subsection 
4 = Extra attention paid to information 
concerning CG 
5 = Comprehensive description of CG 
Completeness, 
verifiability, and 
free from material 
error 
e.g. Jonas and Blanchet, 
2000 
     
Understandability 
Question no. Question Operationalization Concept Literature 
U1 To what extent is the annual report 
presented in a well organized 
manner? 
1 = Very bad presentation                                       
2 = Bad presentation                                               
3 = Poor presentation                                                
4 = Good presentation  
Understandability e.g. Jonas and Blanchet, 
2000 
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5 = Very good presentation  
U2 To what extent are the notes in the 
balance sheet and the income 
statement sufficiently clear?  
1 = No explanation 
2 = Very short description, difficult to 
understand 
3 = Explanation that describes what happens  
4 = Terms are explained (which assumptions 
etc.) 
5 = Everything that might be difficult to 
understand is explained 
Understandability e.g. Jonas and Blanchet, 
2000 
U3 To what extent does the presence 
of graphs and tables clarifies the 
presented information? 
1 = no graphs 
2 = 1-5 graphs 
3 = 6-10 graphs 
4 = 11-15 graphs 
5 = > 15 graphs 
Understandability e.g. Jonas and Blanchet, 
2000 
U4 To what extent is the use of  
language and technical jargon in 
the annual report easy to follow? 
1 = Much jargon (industry), not explained 
2 = Much jargon, minimal explanation 
3 = jargon is explained in text 
4 = Not much jargon, or well explained 
5 = No jargon, or extraordinary explanation 
Understandability e.g. Jonas and Blanchet, 
2000 
 
Comparability     
Question no. Question Operationalization Concept Literature 
C1 To what extent do the notes to 
changes in accounting policies 
explain the implications of the 
change? 
1 = Changes not explained 
2 = Minimum explanation 
3 = Explained why 
4 = Explained why + consequences 
5 = No changes or comprehensive explanation 
Consistency e.g. Jonas and Blanchet, 
2000 
C2 To what extent do the notes to 
revisions in accounting estimates 
and judgments explain the 
implications of the revision? 
1 = Revision without notes 
2 = Revision with few notes 
3 = No revision/clear notes 
4 = clear notes + implications (past) 
5 = Comprehensive notes 
Consistency  e.g. Jonas and Blanchet, 
2000 
C3 To what extent did the company 
adjust previous accounting 
period’s figures, for the effect of 
1 = No adjustments 
2 = Described adjustments 
3 = Actual adjustments (one year) 
Consistency e.g. Jonas and Blanchet, 
2000 
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the implementation of a change in 
accounting policy or revisions in 
accounting estimates? 
4 = 2 years 
5 = > 2 years + notes 
C4 To what extent does the company 
provide a comparison of the results 
of current accounting period with 
previous accounting periods? 
1 = No comparison  
2 = Only with previous year  
3 = With 5 years  
4 = 5 years + description of implications 
5 = 10 years + description of implications 
Consistency e.g. Jonas and Blanchet, 
2000 
C5 To what extent is the information 
in the annual report comparable to 
information provided by other 
organizations? 
1 = No comparability                                     
2 = Limited comparability                                
3 = Moderate comparability                              
4 = Very much comparability        
5 = Very extensive comparability 
Comparability e.g. IASB, 2008; Jonas and 
Blanchet, 2000 
C6 To what extent does the company 
presents financial index numbers 
and ratios in the annual report? 
1 = No ratios 
2 = 1-2 ratios 
3 = 3-5 ratios 
4 = 6-10 ratios 
5 = > 10 ratios 
Comparability e.g. Cleary, 1999 
Timeliness 
Question no.  Question Operationalization Concept Literature 
T1 How many days did it take for the 
auditor to sign the auditors’ report 
after book-year end? 
Natural logarithm of amount of days 
1 = 1-1.99 
2 = 2-2.99 
3 = 3-3.99 
4 = 4-4.99  
5 = 5-5.99 
Timeliness e.g. IASB, 2008; Leventis 
and Weetman (2004) 
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APPENDIX B: Weights of items (score of disclosure quantity) 
Items of (Botosan, 1997) index 
1 Background Information 
 1 A statement of corporate goals or objectives is provided 4,33 
2 A general statement of corporate strategy is provided 4,5 
3 Actions taken during the year to achieve the corporate goals are discussed 4,25 
4 Planned actions to be taken in future years are discussed 4,47 
5 A time frame for achieving corporate goals is defined 4,25 
6 Barriers to entry are discussed 3,8 
7 Impact of barriers to entry on current profits are discussed 3,85 
8 The competitive environment is discussed 4,53 
9 The impact of competition on current profits is discussed  4,35 
10 The impact of competition on future profits is discussed 4,5 
11 A general description of the business is provided 3,88 
12 The principal products produced are identified 3,98 
13 Specific characteristics of these products are described 3,75 
14 The principal markets are identified 4,3 
15 Specific characteristics of these markets are described 4,13 
2 Summary of historical results 
 16 Return-on-assets or sufficient information to compute return-on-assets (i.e. net income, 
tax rate, interest expense and total assets) is provided 
4 ,33 
17 Net profit margin or sufficient information to compute net profit margin (i.e. net income, 
tax rate, interest expense and sales) is provided 
4,32 
18 Asset turnover or sufficient information to compute asset turnover (i.e. sales and total 
assets) is provided 
3,95 
19 Return-on-equity or sufficient information to compute return-on-equity (i.e. net income 
and stockholders equity) is provided 
4,22 
20 A summary of sales and net income for at least the most recent eight quarter is provided 4,22 
3 Key non-financial statistics 
 21 Number of employees 3,58 
22 Order backlog 3,92 
23 Percentage of order backlog to be shipped next year 4,23 
24 Percentage of sales in products designed in the last five years 3,95 
25 Market share 4,6 
26 Amount of new orders placed this year 4,15 
27 Units sold 4,10 
28 Unit selling price 3,78 
29 Growth in units sold 4,08 
30 Production lead time 3,65 
31 Sales growth in key regions not reported as geographic segments 3,85 
32 Volume of materials consumed 3,7 
33 Price of materials consumed 3,95 
34 Growth in sales of key products not reported as product segments 3,98 
4 Projected information 
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 35 A comparison of previous earnings projections to actual earnings is provided 4,45 
36 A comparison of previous sales projections to actual sales is provided 4,47 
37 The impact of opportunities available to the firm on future sales or profits 4,2 
38 The impact of risks facing the firm on future sales or profits is discussed 4,27 
39 A forecast of market share is provided 4,35 
40 A cash flow projection is provided 4,13 
41 A projection of future profits is provided  4,5 
42 A projection of future sales is provided 4,6 
5 Management discussion and analysis 
 43 Change in sales 4,3 
44 Change in operating income 4,3 
45 Change in cost of goods sold 4,18 
46 Change in cost of goods sold as a percentage of sales 3,98 
47 Change in gross profits 4,35 
48 Change in gross profits as a percentage of sales 4,17 
49 Change in selling and administrative expenses 3,85 
50 Change in interest expense or interest income   4 
51 Change in net income 4,55 
52 Change in inventory 3,95 
53 Change in account receivable 4,22 
54 Change in capital expenditures or R & D 3,88 
55 Change in market share 4,45 
Items added to (Botosan, 1997) index 
6 Information on the intangibles  
 56 Description of key customers 3,9 
57 Description of key suppliers 3,87 
58 Description of the activities of R & D 3,65 
59 Results of R & D implemented 3,78 
7 Social and environmental Information 
 60 Rate of employee absenteeism and number of strike days 3,13 
61 Training and skills development for employees 3,58 
62 Description of charitable donations, grants, financial aid 2,68 
63 Description of the firm's commitment to the community for specific social 
projects(community activities, cultural, educational, recreational and sports) 
2,68 
64 Statement of activities for the protection and preservation of the physical 
environment(natural resources conservation, energy management, wildlife and flora ...) 
3,08 
65 Description of activities to reduce pollution related to business activities 2,95 
66 Production and promotion of ecological products (prohibiting the use of chemical 
components harmful to health and ecosystems, recyclable packaging design… 
2,85 
8 Information on corporate governance 
 67 Ownership structure (major shareholders) 4,65 
68 Percentage ownership by major shareholders 4,55 
69 Composition of the Board 4,27 
70 The mandates of the administrators 3,82 
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71 Profile of administrators 3,85 
72 The frequency of meetings of the Board 3,55 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes 
1 Which have a field of application covering most of the trading companies 
2 Of which the fields of application extend to all the companies publicly appealing to savings. 
3 Which relates to public offering 
4 e.g. survey-based subjective disclosure ratings, researcher-constructed disclosure indices 
5 These topics were chosen based on the guidance on voluntary risk reporting discussed by professional bodies 
(i.e. FASB, 2001). 
6Botosan (2004) identified the qualitative attributes of disclosure quality namely,: understandability; relevance,; 
reliability; and comparability;  these enhanced the usefulness of information to economic decision makers. 
 
7 The definition of an independent administrator is unclear in Tunisian Law. 
8  According to Article 189 of the Code of Commercial Companies, the number of administrators is fixed 
deliberately in the company’s statutes and must be between at least 3 members and 12 at most. 
9 To what extent does the company use fair value instead of historical cost? 
10 What is the size of Glossary? 
11The IASB framework identifies four qualitative characteristics of information that enhance the usefulness of 
information to economic decision makers: understandability; relevance; reliability; and comparability.  
12 They are most important and determine the quality of information. 
13They can improve decision usefulness when the fundamental qualitative characteristics are established. However, 
they cannot determine disclosure quality on their own (IASB, 2008). 
 
14 Several studies, such as the studies of Singleton and Globerman (2002) and Rahman (2002), were based on the 
Botosan index (1997). 
15We circulated 62 questionnaires to the population of financial analysts and portfolio managers. We obtained a 
64.51% response rate.  
16The weight of each item was the sum of points assigned by the respondents to the item divided by the number of 
the respondents.   
17 who analyzed the relationship between corporate governance structures and the extent of voluntary disclosure 
in companies listed in Hong Kong, 
18 who investigated board composition, regulatory regime and voluntary disclosure in Singapore-listed firms. 
                                                          
